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Situation Semantics: the ontological balance sheet ∗
Jonathan Ginzburg (ginzburg@dcs.kcl.ac.uk)
King’s College, London
Abstract. One of the important challenges facing NL semantics in the early 21st
century is to theoretically underpin analysis and generation of conversational in-
teraction. I start by considering certain requirements a semantic framework needs
in order to be viable for this task, with reference to a benchmark example. One
fundamental requirement is the provision of an ontology which incorporates pro-
positions, questions, and similar abstract entities. The main theme of this paper
concerns the construction of such an ontology. I argue that Barwise and Perry’s
approach to ontology—including its nonstandard trichotomy distinguishing between
situations/events, situation types, and propositions—provides useful building blocks.
I implement the construction using the type theoretic framework developed by
Cooper (this journal).
Keywords: situation semantics, situation theory, type theory, ontology, abstract
entities
1. Situation Semantics in the 21st Century?
The scene pictured in figure 1 is taken from a virtual reality en-
vironment developed by (Institute for Creative Technologies, 2003).
The conversational agents (the sergeant and medic) can engage in
conversation with a human. One of the important challenges facing
NL semantics in the early 21st century is to theoretically underpin
analysis and generation of conversational exchanges like the multilogue
(from (Traum, 2003)), which takes place in this scene:
(1) 1 L(ieutenant): What happened here?
2 S(ergeant): There was an accident.
∗ This paper was presented at the workshop Barwise and Situation Semantics,
held at Stanford in June 2003. The workshop was dedicated to the memory of Jon
Barwise and was greatly enhanced by the presence of John Perry. My own initial
interest in NL semantics was greatly spurred by the work of Barwise and Perry.
I would like to thank Tim Fernando for organizing the workshop, for discussion,
and for patient and careful comments on the paper. I am grateful to Robin Cooper
for lots of instruction and suggestions concerning type theory. I would also wish to
thank David Beaver, Graham Katz, and David Traum for discussions during the
workshop or while writing the paper. Last but by no means least, many thanks to
an anonymous reviewer for Research on Language and Computation for some very
useful comments, which triggered a substantial rewriting of the paper. The research
described here is funded by grant number RES-000-23-0065 from the Economic and
Social Research Council of the United Kingdom.
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Figure 1. A situation in Bosnia
3 L: Who’s hurt?
4 S: The boy and one of our drivers.
5 L: How bad is he hurt?
6 S: The driver or the boy?
7 L: The boy.
8 S: Tucci?
9 M(edic): The boy has critical injuries.
10 S: Understood.
I start by sketching an informal analysis of (1). To the best of my
knowledge, no existing grammar fragment or implemented system can
fully implement this analysis.1 In this respect, examples like (1) can
serve as benchmarks for contemporary semantic research. I will then
suggest certain requirements a semantic framework needs in order to
implement such an analysis—among other things, I will compare these
with the perspective on semantics of 1980s situation semantics.
In (2) I provide partially de-contextualized paraphrases of the
various utterances that make up the conversation:2
1 The Mission Rehearsal Exercise system, (Institute for Creative Technologies,
2003), obviously comes closest, though for certain phenomena it makes use of
heuristic-based techniques.
2 Of course various aspects of these paraphrases reflect my theoretical biases. But
I doubt any given paraphrase is particularly controversial.
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(2) 1 L(ieutenant): What happened here? L is asking what (situ-
ation/incident) happened in location l0.
2 S(ergeant): There was an accident. S is saying that (the situ-
ation that happened in location l0) was an accident .
3 L: Who’s hurt? L is asking who’s hurt in this accident
4 S: The boy and our driver. S is saying that b0 and d0 were
hurt in this accident.
5 L: How bad is he hurt? L is asking how bad is he hurt
6 S: The driver or the boy? S is asking if L’s ‘he’ refers to b0
or does it refer to d0?
7 L: The boy. L is saying that ‘he’ refers to b0.
8 S: Tucci? S is asking Tucci to answer the question about how
bad b0 is hurt
9 M(edic): The boy has critical injuries. (Tucci is saying that)
b0 has critical injuries.
10 S: Understood. S is saying that he understands what Tucci
has just said.
Coming up with (2) involves tasks such as the following:
(3) a. An account of the verb ‘happen’—presumably this is to
be analyzed somehow as involving a relation between situ-
ations/events and spatio-temporal locations that extend into
them; for some discussion see (Parsons, 1990).3 The accident
situation involved here serves as the ‘domain’ for utterances 3,
4
b. Indexicality is implicated in utterances (1, 3, 4, 5), e.g. in the
resolution of ‘here’, ‘he’, ‘the boy’, and of course tense.
c. Metacommunicative meaning: (6) is a request for the clarific-
ation of (5). It involves a complex process in which ellipsis
resolution combines with a grammatical device relating to
disjunction and alternative questions. The ellipsis resolution
involves constructing an appropriate predicate using material
from the partially comprehended utterance (5); the interpreta-
tion of (10) involves the previous utterance as the argument of
the predicate ‘understand’.
d. Dialogue moves: none of the utterances involves an explicit per-
formative (‘I’d like to ask the following:’, ‘I claim that . . . ’) and
3 As Parsons points out, ‘happen’ does not introduce its own de-
scribed situation—there is no separate happening event above and beyond the
event/situation that happens.
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yet, minimally, the force of any given utterance is as indicated
(‘L asks . . . ’, ‘S says that . . . ’ etc)
e. Question/Answer dynamics is involved in the interpretation of
utterances (2, 4, 7, 9). This includes the resolution of the short
answers in (4,7) and the availability of the question raised in
(5) to Tucci in utterance (9).
These tasks correlate with five requirements:
(4) a. A theory of external reality on the basis of which scenes like
that depicted in (1) can be described.
b. A theory of how utterance meanings get anchored in speech
events.
c. A theory of metacommunicative interaction.
d. A theory of dialogue moves.
e. A theory of dialogue context.
A semantic theory for the 21st century needs to integrate these
various requirements. How does this relate to the work and accom-
plishments of situation semantics’ original programme?4
Bringing situations into the picture was an important component
of Barwise and Perry’s program that involved developing tools for de-
scribing external reality in terms that can capture the resource-bounded
nature of perception. Another key aspect of situation semantics, that
has had a far lesser impact, is the utterance-based formulation of
semantics initiated in Situation and Attitudes. Barwise and Perry ar-
gued that semantics should take utterances, spatio-temporally located
speech events, as the entities whose contents it analyzes. Meanings, on
this view, pertain to types of utterances. Indexicality is then accom-
modated directly as the dependence on features that characterize the
speech event.
Classical situation semantics did not develop a theory of meta-
communicative interaction, but it did provide important conceptual
apparatus therefor. These components—the reification of utterances as
4 A distinction came to be drawn between Situation Theory and Situation Se-
mantics, the former pertaining roughly to logical aspects of the program, the latter
to linguistic aspects. Given the rather small cardinality of people who engage in
either at this stage, I will stick with the latter, which has the unfortunate property
nonetheless of possessing an unusable two letter acronym. In its stead I will use the
word sitsemian.
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real world events and the view of meanings as abstracts over contextual
parameters—are a vital basis for at least one theory of grounding and
clarification potential (Ginzburg and Cooper, 2004).
Two other areas which classical situation semantics did not concern
itself with are a theory of dialogue moves (known in an earlier epoch as
speech act theory) and a theory of dialogue context. (see e.g. (Poesio
and Traum, 1997; Ginzburg, 1996; Trindi Consortium, 2000; Asher and
Lascarides, 2003)). What is common to these two areas, which are
actually strongly integrated, is that they both presuppose ontologies
which incorporate propositions, questions, and similar abstract entities.
The main theme of this paper concerns the development of such
ontologies and how they can be integrated with the ontology of external
reality envisaged by Barwise and Perry. I start by discussing briefly why
the sitsemian approach to ontology provides useful building blocks for
such ontologies. I then motivate an ontological trichotomy—the dis-
tinction between situations/events, situation types, and propositions.
Finally, I sketch the construction of a semantic ontology using the type
theoretic framework developed by Cooper (this journal).
2. Situation Semantics and Ontological Innovation
One of Situation Semantics’ important contributions was the placing
of ontological investigation at the centre of semantics. In this section I
would like to review some of the main characteristics of this approach
to ontology initiated in Jon Barwise’s seminal ‘Scenes and other situ-
ations’ (Barwise, 1989a). A one sentence summary can be found in the
following quote from Barwise and Perry (1983):
(5) The primitives of our theory are all real things: individuals,
properties, relations, and space-time locations. Out of these
and objects available from the set theory we construct a
universe of abstract objects. (Situations and Attitudes, p.
178)
The theory has evolved over the years on two dimensions: which
set theory to be used and the identity of the abstract objects. The
initial set theory used was Kripke-Platek admissible set theory with
urelements. Initially propositions were rejected as ‘artifact(s) of the se-
mantic endeavor’ (Situations and Attitudes, loc. cit), though as Barwise
and Perry (1985) admitted, this was not a move they were required
to make. Indeed, propositions, austinian propositions, were the stars
of The Liar (Barwise and Etchemendy, 1987), whose other significant
rlc-fin.tex; 10/05/2005; 1:45; p.5
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innovation was the use of Aczel’s Non-Well-Founded set theory AFA
(Aczel, 1988). The move to this richer ontology was instigated in part by
an observation due to Soames (1986) that although logical omniscience
can be defused merely by ‘going partial’, new variants of this problem
arise for a situation-based approach. It is only by combining partiality
with characterization of propositions employing structured objects that
a defensible level of fine grain is achieved.
A key ontological innovation in post-1985 sitsemian work was the
postulation of a trichotomy: situations v. situation types, also known
as SOAs or infons,5 v. propositions.
Briefly, situation types are structured objects that function as ‘po-
tential properties’ situations can possess: situation types are taken to
be structured from two components, a relation R, and an assignment
α, which assigns real world entities to the argument roles of R, as in
(6a). The notation in (6b) indicates that the situation s is of the type
given by the situation type 〈〈R;α〉〉. If a situation fails to be correctly
classified by a situation type σ, this is notated as in (6c).
(6) a. 〈〈CALM ; loc : Jerusalem〉〉
b. s |= 〈〈R;α〉〉
c. s 6|= 〈〈R;α〉〉
Situation types are assumed to come in positive/negative pairs, i.e.
every relation/assignment pair gives rise to a positive situation type
and a negative situation type. We will assume the positive ones to
be (notationally) unmarked, and notate the corresponding negative
with an ‘overline’, as in (7a). Because situations are partial, there is a
difference between a situation failing to be correctly classified by σ and
being correctly classified by σ. For any situation s and situation type
σ, (7b) holds, but (7c) generally fails:
(7) a. s |= 〈〈R;α〉〉
b. Either s |= σ or s 6|= σ
c. Either s |= σ or s |= σ
The intuition is that classifying s with σ means that s actually
possesses information which rules out σ, rather than simply lacking
5 I have been informed that in Dutch ‘SOA’ stands for sexually transmitted
disease (Sexueel Overdraagbare Aandoeningen) and most semanticists treat them
accordingly. The reintroduction of the term ‘situation types’ is related to our
subsequent move to a type theoretic framework.
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concrete evidence for σ. So, for instance, a situation I perceive in
London slondon would typically neither be of the type 〈〈CALM ; loc :
Jerusalem〉〉, nor of the type 〈〈CALM ; loc : Jerusalem〉〉. slondon
is simply indeterminate about the issue of Jerusalem’s calamity or
calmness.
Basic (i.e. non-compound) propositions are taken to be structured
objects, whose immediate components are a situation s and a situation
type σ, notated inter alia as prop(s, σ). The truth conditions of such
propositions are straightforward to describe:
(8) prop(s, σ) is true iff s |= σ
Characterizing situations by means of situation types allows for a
fine-grained, but intentional theory of propositions. Thus, the sitsemian
theory of propositions would distinguish, for instance, the propositions
associated with (9a,b), uttered, say, when observing the graves of two
great French composers:
(9) a. Marais is identical with himself.
b. Poulenc is identical with himself.
c. prop(sfr−pantheon, 〈〈SelfIdentical;marais〉〉)
d. prop(sfr−pantheon, 〈〈SelfIdentical; poulenc〉〉)
But it is not overly fine-grained so as not to support indexical infer-
ence or translation. Thus, the theory would identify the content of the
Arabic utterance (10a) and the Hebrew utterance (10b):
(10) a. ElQuds hadi’a.
b. yerushalayim regu’a.
c. prop(sjlem, 〈〈CALM ; loc : Jerusalem〉〉)
Moreover, by assuming a proposition has a situation as a component,
the potential for developing a straightforward account of event ana-
phora, as in (11) emerges. An assertoric utterance enables subsequent
anaphoric reference to an event, even if the assertion is not accepted,
as in (11c). This is of course another facet of the intentionality of
propositions we mentioned above:
(11) a. A: My back tyre exploded. Two minutes later it started to rain.
b. A: Jo and Mo got married yesterday. It was a wonderful
occasion.
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c. A: Jo’s arriving next week. B: No, that’s happening in about a
month.
Indeed, for whatever it is worth, this type of representation for utter-
ances jives well with psychological work on memory (see e.g. (Fletcher,
1994) for a review), which argues that the two robust memory traces
from an utterance are (a) the situational model and (b) the proposi-
tional text base. The former is a representation which integrates various
modalities (e.g. visual and linguistic stimuli), whereas the latter differs
from the surface form of an utterance for instance in that referents have
been resolved. Of course by positing a situational component in pro-
positional representation a new resolution problem emerges, additional
to inter alia nominal and temporal reference. How humans deal with
this problem in conversation is still to a large extent unexpolored.6
3. Motivation for situation types?
What, then, are the survival prospects of the
situation/situation-type/proposition trichotomy, which collapses into
a dichotomy or even a single point in most other theories? Actu-
ally, the main focus needs to be on the situation type/proposition
distinction—situation types undoubtedly being the most theory in-
ternal entity of the three and whose natural environment is under
the severest existential threat. I start by considering some motivation
for the proposition/sit-type distinction: the first derives from an ar-
gument by Barwise, which I will suggest is problematic. The second
argument, which I subscribe to, was offered by Ginzburg and Sag
(2000). The situation-type/proposition distinction underpins one of the
fundamental claims of Ginzburg and Sag (2000)—that questions denote
propositional abstracts. I will review some evidence for this claim.
3.1. Facts = Factual situation types?
It has been common among situation semanticists to use the termin-
ology ‘facts’ for situation types supported by at least one situation.
This terminology invites a significant ontological identification, which
Barwise (1989b) sought to use as motivation for situation types. There
is a significant literature initiated by philosophers such as Vendler
which indicates that facts qua denotata of NPs such as ‘the/a/that
6 Though see experimental work by Tanenhaus and colleagues on the resolution
of definites, e.g. (Brown-Schmidt et al., 2003) for an example of precisely such an
investigation.
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fact’ should not be identified with (true) propositions (see in partic-
ular (Vendler, 1972; Peterson, 1997; Ginzburg and Sag, 2000)). For
instance, (12b) show that truth/falsity is not predicable of a POSS-
gerund, which occurs in a factive context in (12a). (12c,d) show that a
truth/falsity–denoting NP obeys substitutivity under ‘believe’, but not
under a factive verb such as ‘remember’:
(12) a. Tony’s having savaged the party distressed the member for
Tooting.
b. # Tony’s having savaged the party was true/false.
c. The claim is that Jo left. Bo believes that claim. Hence, Bo
believes that Jo left.
d. The claim is that Jo left. Bo remembers that claim. # Hence,
Bo remembered that Jo left.
As Ginzburg (1993) points out, there is, however, an intrinsic prob-
lem with this identification of “philosophers’ facts” with the sitsemian
facts. For this identification to be motivated, we would be required
to find a striking semantic difference in terms of their ‘situational
grounding’ between the objects of belief and assertion and the objects
of knowledge or discovery. This given that in situation semantics the
former are taken to be (situationally relativized) austinian propositions
whereas the latter are absolute, ‘non-perspectival’ types. But there is
no evidence for such a distinction.
3.2. The Frege-Searle propositional content hypothesis
Speech Act Theory (see e.g. (Searle, 1969; Searle and Vanderveken,
1985)), is the framework of choice for much influential work on dialogue
(see e.g. (Cohen and Perrault, 1979; Allen and Perrault, 1980; Lit-
man and Allen, 1987; Allen, 1995). Speech Act Theory embodies an
important insight, namely the need to associate with utterances an
illocutionary content, i.e. a content which embeds a semantic entity
such as a proposition or question under a predicate that represents the
current conversational move (assert, ask etc). However, the ontological
perspective of most Speech Act work still draws on a fundamental claim
of (Frege, 1918), much trumpeted by Searle, namely that:
(13) Assertions, polar queries, and commands differ on the level of il-
locutionary force, but share the same descriptive/propositional
content (the Frege-Searle propositional content hy-
pothesis(FSPCH)).
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Concretely, the claim is this: uttered in the same context, declarat-
ive, interrogative, and imperative variants as in (14) have the same
(descriptive/propositional) content, namely some proposition p; the
difference between these potential utterances, on this view, is that (14a)
will be used to assert p, whereas (14b) will be used to ask p, and (14c)
to command p:
(14) a. Bo will go away. (Content: Assert(A,B,p))
b. Will Bo go away? (Content: Ask(A,B,p))
c. Go away Bo! (Content: Command(A,B,p))
The FSPCH encodes a plausible intuition, which still constitutes
an article of faith among philosophers. There are, however, various
considerations that indicate that the FSPCH cannot be maintained.
I mention here a subcase of the FSPCH, namely the identification
of propositions and (polar) questions. There are also problems with
semantically identifying propositions and the denotata of imperatives.
For details see (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000), section 3.2.
If a polar interrogative denotes a proposition it should be assertible
and bear a truth value, neither of which is the case:
(15) a. I’m going to make one claim: #Did Bo leave?
b. #It is true/false whether Bo left.
Moreover, a polar interrogative utterance should be disquotable us-
ing a ‘that clause’. In fact, such a disquotation is not possible, but
requires instead the complementizer ‘whether’:
(16) a. A: Did Bo leave?
b. A asked whether/that Bo left.
That this syntactic distinction has denotational consequences is il-
lustrated in (17). (17a) differs from (17b) in allowing for the possibility
that Jo didn’t leave:
(17) a. Bo knows whether Jo left.
b. Bo knows that Jo left.
Indeed in much AI work including the references given previously,
wh-interrogatives are also interpreted as propositions, with the wh-
phrases functioning as definite descriptions. Thus, (18a) is interpreted
as
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(18) a. Who left?
b. the x: left(x)
There are, similarly, a variety of arguments against identifying the
denotata of wh-interrogative sentences with propositions. One such
argument, due to (Karttunen, 1977), derives from the existence of
a class of predicates which embed interrogative but not declarative
complements:
(19) a. Brooke asked/wondered/investigated who left.
b. #Brooke asked/wondered/investigated that Drew left.
(20) a. Who wins the race depends upon/is influenced by who enters
it.
b. #That Jo will win the race depends on/is influenced by that
Mary didn’t show up.
These sorts of complement selection patterns are cross-linguistically
stable and reflect fundamental lexical semantic properties of the
embedding predicates (for details see (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000)). Kart-
tunen’s argument constitutes one of the starting points of an approach
to semantics, which countenances an ontological distinction between
propositions and questions, the denotata of interrogative clauses.
Given arguments of the type presented above, it is clear that the
FSPCH cannot be maintained. And yet, a weak version of the FSPCH
is needed since, as (21) illustrates, quantified NPs and certain adverbs
are possible in all three semantic environments. Hence, the ontology
must provide a semantic unit which constitutes the input/output of
such adverbial modifiers and of NP quantification:7
(21) a. Everyone vacated the building.
b. Did everyone vacate the building?
c. Everyone vacate the building!
7 To make this concrete—the assumption that the denotation of imperatives is of
a type distinct from t (however cashed out) is difficult to square with (a simplistic
implementation) of the received wisdom that NPs such as ‘everyone’ are of type
< e, t, t >. If the latter were the case, composing ‘everyone’ with ‘vacate the building’
in (21c) would yield a denotation of type t.
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(22) a. Kim always wins.
b. Does Kim always win?
c. Always wear white!
A good candidate for this are situation types, as we will see in
sections 4.
3.3. An explanatory benefit
Let me point now to an explanatory benefit that arises from the ex-
istence of a situation-type/proposition distinction. This derives from
interrogatives. In much computational work and some theoretical work,
interrogatives are taken to denote n-ary λ-abstracts:
(23) a. Who left 7→ λx.left(x)
b. Who saw who 7→ λx, y.see(x, y)
There is much to recommend about this strategy—it offers the basis
for a theory of the ‘short answers’ characteristic in responses to quer-
ies (A: Who left? B: Bo) and can underpin a theory of the various
answerhood relations semantic theory requires (resolving answerhood,
aboutness answerhood etc). However, in most ontological settings, this
strategy seems to be highly problematic. It requires us to identify
questions with (what are commonly taken to be) the denotations of
verbs, common nouns, and adjectives:
(24) a. left 7→ λx.left(x)
b. see 7→ λx, y.see(x, y)
As data like (25a,b) shows, identifying questions with properties
seems quite counterintuitive:
(25) a. Some man is happy.
So we know that happiness and manfulness are not incompat-
ible.
#So we know that the question of who is happy and who is a
man are not incompatible.
b. A: What was Bill yesterday?
B: Happy.
B: #The question of who is happy.
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Ginzburg and Sag (2000) point out that a straightforward solution
to this problem exists in a sitsemian ontological setting: verbs, common
nouns, and adjectives are taken to denote situation-type abstracts,
whereas questions denote propositional abstracts.
Wait. But is there positive evidence that questions are propositional
abstracts, as opposed to any other type of abstract? (Ginzburg and
Sag, 2000) provide a concrete argument for the view, based on the dis-
tribution of wh-in situ phrases in English. Interestingly, in declarative
clause-types, that in the absence of a wh-phrase denote propositions,
the occurrence of such phrases leads to an ambiguity between two
readings: a ‘canonical’ use which expresses a direct query and a use as
a reprise query to request clarification of a preceding utterance. In all
other clause types, ones which denote outcomes (26d), questions (26e),
or facts (26f) the ambiguity does not arise, only a reprise reading is
available:8,9
(26) a. The bagels, you gave to who? (can be used to make a non-
reprise query.)
b. You gave the bagels to who? (can be used to make a non-reprise
query.)
c. Who talked to who? (can be used to make a non-reprise query.)
d. Give who the book? (can be used only to make a reprise query.)
e. Do I like who? (can be used only to make a reprise query.)
f. What a winner who is? (can be used only to make a reprise
query.)
((Ginzburg and Sag, 2000), example (72), p. 282)
The conclusion of Ginzburg and Sag (2000) is that questions can
only be built from within a proposition–denoting environment. In other
words, they are propositional abstracts.
8 Ginzburg and Sag (2000) argue that (wh-phrase-less) imperative and subjunct-
ive clauses denote a class of entities they dub outcomes, more on which in section 4
below. They also suggest that polar interrogatives denote questions, and exclamative
clauses denote (Vendlerian) facts.
9 a priori one might expect (26d), for instance, to have a reading as a direct
question paraphrasable as who should I give the book to? if one could simply abstract
over the wh-parameter within an ‘open outcome’.
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4. Situational Universes with Abstract Entities, type
theoretically
In order to develop a formal account of data such as (21), (22), and
(26) mentioned in the previous section, one needs to make reference to
an ontology that contains all the relevant entities. Ginzburg and Sag
(2000) developed such an ontology, dubbed a Situational Universe with
Abstract Entities (SU+AE). The strategy for developing SU+AEs was
very much in line with the strategy of Barwise and Perry’s (5). This
was implemented in the AFA-based framework of Seligman and Moss
1997. Simplifying somewhat, an SU+AE is an extensional relational
structure of the following type:
(27) [ A, Possibility, Proposition,Outcome,
Fact, T rue, Fulfill,→prop ]
Let me gloss the key notions involved here: A is a λ-situation
structure (λ-SITSTR). That is, a situation structure closed under sim-
ultaneous abstraction.10 A situation structure (SITSTR) is a universe
which supports a basic set theoretic structure. It contains among its
entities a class of spatio-temporally located situations and a class of
situation types. Proposition, Possibility, and Outcome are sorts whose
elements represent, respectively, the propositions, possibilities, and out-
comes of the universe.11 Following our discussion in section 3.1, we also
posit a property Fact, applicable to the class of possibilities. Those
possibilities that are factual, as determined by the predicate Fact, will
constitute the facts of the universe. Analogously, there will be proper-
ties True and Fulfill, which capture the notions of truth and fulfilledness
for propositions and outcomes; →prop is a notion of entailment defined
for propositions.
Underpinned by SU+AEs Ginzburg and Sag (2000) developed ac-
counts of ontologically intensive data like (21), (22), and (26). However,
although no significant empirical problems beset these accounts, there
are foundational issues to contend with. For a start, the account in
(Ginzburg and Sag, 2000) has a schizoid nature: the SU+AE is presen-
ted in two distinct fashions, one purely set theoretic, the other in terms
of typed feature structures (TFSs). The TFS-based account is the
10 For every element a ∈ |S| and every set B ⊂ |S|, the simultaneous abstraction
λB.a exists. What this amounts to precisely need not detain us for the moment,
since I will offer a precise explication of such a notion in type theoretic terms below.
Suffice it to say that an abstract λB.τ is a structured object that arises by an
operation which takes as input an entity τ of the universe and a (possibly empty)
set of its components B.
11 Vendlerian facts are taken to be a subclass of the possibilities.
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one used in building up the grammar and usable in computational
applications, whereas the pure set theoretic formulation constitutes
a semantics for the TFS presentation.12 Furthermore, neither version
of the SU+AE readily provide accounts of role-dependency that has
become de rigeur in recent treatments of anaphora and quantification
on which much semantic work has been invested in frameworks such
as Discourse Representation Theory and Dynamic Semantics. Lastly,
it is interesting to consider to what extent the construction of fine
grained ontologies needed for current purposes depends on using the
special purpose set theoretic techniques (e.g. for modelling abstraction)
of (Seligman and Moss, 1997).
These concerns can be allayed by using a type theoretic framework
like that built up in Cooper (this journal). Ever since Ranta’s pioneering
work (Ranta, 1994), there has been interest in using constructive type
theory (CTT) (often referred to as Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory (MLTT))
as a framework for semantics (see e.g. (Fernando, 2001; Krahmer and
Piwek, 1999)). CTT offers theoretically satisfying tools for dealing with
role dependence that enable accounts of anaphora and quantificational
phenomena to be developed. Its provision of entities at both levels
of tokens and types allows one to combine aspects of the TFS world
and the set theoretic world, obviating the need for the two formu-
lations. Indeed, in a number of papers, including Cooper (1998, this
journal), Robin Cooper has shown that there are significant common-
alities between situation semantics and a version of CTT with records
(Type Theory with Records (TTR)) and that the latter allows for a
perspicuous interpretation of notions from the former. Drawing heavily
on this, my aim in the remaining sections of the paper is to show how
SU+AEs can be located within a type theoretic universe of the kind
built up in Cooper (this journal) and how they can be used to capture
certain basic ontological facts.13
4.1. Basics of Type Theory
CTT is a proof–theoretic framework initiated in the 1970s by Per Mar-
tin Lo¨f, based on earlier work by intuitionist logicians. The version used
here is the CTT with records and record types ((Betarte and Tasistro,
1998; Kopylov, 2003; Coquand et al., 2003)). The most fundamental
12 Without a separate semantics we agree with Penn (2000) who says (in discussing
a related set of issues), ‘At this point, feature structures are not being used as a
formal device to represent knowledge, but as a formal device to represent data
structures that encode formal devices to represent knowledge’. (Penn, 2000), p. 63.
13 A companion piece (Ginzburg, 2005) details how the TTRfied situation se-
mantics framework can be used to recast the theory of questions of Ginzburg and
Sag (2000) in a more straightforward way.
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notion of CTT is the typing judgement a : T classifying an object
a as being of type T . This can be seen as a generalization of the
situation semantics judgement s |= σ, generalization in that not only
situations can figure as subjects of typing judgements. Note that the
theory provides the objects and the types, but this form of judgement,
as well as other forms are metatheoretical. Examples are given in (28).
(28a-c) are typing judgements that presuppose the existence of types
SIT, IND, REL, whose identity can be amplified. (28d) is the direct
analogue of the situation semantics statement s |= 〈〈RUN ; b, t〉〉; here
run(b,t) is a proof type :14
(28) a. s : SIT
b. b: IND
c. run : REL
d. s : run(b,t)
A highly useful innovation in the version of CTT introduced by
(Betarte and Tasistro, 1998) is the introduction of records and record
types. A record corresponds to a number of kinds of entities in other
semantic theories: the most lowly creature one might liken it to is a
variable assignment, but it also bears significant resemblances to a
typed feature structure and to what used to be called in situation
semantics an abstract situation. Technically, all a record is is an ordered
tuple of the form (29), where crucially each successive field can depend
on the values of the preceding fields:
(29)


li = ki
li+1 = ki+1(li) . . .
li+j = ki+j(li, . . . , li+j−1)


Together with records come record types. Technically, a record type
is simply an ordered tuple of the form (30), where again each successive
type can depend on its predecessor types within the record:
(30)


li : Ti
li+1 : Ti+1(li) . . .
Ti+j : Ti+j(li, . . . , li+j−1)


14 ‘proof’ can be equally glossed as ‘observation’ or even ‘situation’, as explained
by (Ranta, 1994); the source of the ‘proof-based’ terminology is CTT’s initial use
as a foundation for mathematics.
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Record types allow us to place constraints on records: the basic
typing mechanism assumed is that a record r is of type RT if all the
typing constraints imposed by RT are satisfied by r. More precisely,
(31) The record:

l1 = a1
l2 = a2
. . .
ln = an

 is of type:


l1 : T1
l2 : T2(l1)
. . .
ln : Tn(l1, l2, . . . , ln−1)


iff a1 : T1, a2 : T2(a1), . . . , an : Tn(a1, a2, . . . , an−1)
Crucially, not all the fields in r need to be ‘disciplined’ by RT .
Thus, for example, the record in (32a) is of all the types (32b-e).
Indeed, all records are of the empty type (32e), the type that imposes
no constraints:
(32) a.


r = bo
t = 2pm, Dec 20
l = batumi


(b)


r : Ind
t : Time
l : Loc


(c)
[
r : Ind
t : Time
]
(d)
[
r : Ind
]
(e)
[ ]
4.2. Connecting to the Real World: situations and their
types
The preceding section gave a taste of the basic entities of TTR. My
main aim in what follows is to show how an SU+AE can be found with
fairly minimal effort within the universe defined by TTR. What then
is the Type Theoretic World? Cooper (this journal) offers essentially
the following answer:15
(33) Type Theoretic World (Cooper (this journal), simpli-
fied)
TYPE = 〈 Typen, BasicType, ProofTypen, RecTypen, 〈A,Fn〉〉
a. Typen is the set of types of order n, built up recursively using
type construction operations.
15 This is a simplified description of Cooper’s proposal, which the careful reader
would do well to consult.
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b. BasicType: IND, TIME, LOC, . . .
c. ProofTypen (“interface with external reality”): tuples consist-
ing of entities [from the model] and predicates.
d. RecTypen: set of records, record types defined with respect to
a set of objects used as labels.
e. 〈A,Fn〉 is a model (assigning entities to BasicType, and tuples
to ProofTypen).
As with SU+AEs, one can recognize here the sitsemian strategy
Barwise and Perry allude to in (5). The universe is connected to the
real world via the proof types and the model. This latter grounds the
basic types. From these beginnings, arise structured objects via two
recursive mechanisms, type construction and record cutting16.
Let us consider first how situations/events and situation types fit
in this ontology. Proof types play a role akin to (atomic) situation
types in situation semantics, serving as the smallest particles of external
reality. Combining these into record types allows us to form ‘molecules’
of external reality. Assuming the existence of basic types TIME and
LOC(ation), one could offer (34) as the most rudimentary notion of
situation, namely that it is a record which carries information about
spatio-temporal extent:
(34) SIT =def
[
time : TIME
loc : LOC
]
The type of a situation with a woman riding a bicycle would then be
the one in (35a). A record of this type (a witness for this type) would
be as in (35b), where the required corresponding typing judgements are
given in (35c):
(35)(a)


x: IND
c1: woman(x)
y: IND
c2: bicycle(y)
time : TIME
loc:LOC
c3: ride(x,y,time,loc)


(b)


. . .
x = a
c1 = p1
y = b
c2 = p2
time = t0
loc = l0
c3 = p3
. . .


16 I assume this is the right term to describe the emergence of a record/record
type.
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(c) a:IND; p1: woman(a); b: IND; p2: bicycle(b); t0 : TIME; l0 :
LOC;p3: ride(a,b,t0,l0);
A theory of situations requires various topological, physical and
other constraints to be imposed on the universe of records, as explained
in more detail by Cooper (this journal).
4.3. Propositions in TTR
The first abstract entity we consider in the universe is the class of
propositions. In fact, as I noted above, standardly type theory takes
judgements such as a : T as metatheoretical but does not countenance
propositional entities as such. I have suggested above that the Austinian
notion of propositions developed in situation semantics has a number of
positive characteristics—its size of grain seems defensible, it can under-
pin a theory of event anaphora, and its combination of (event/situation)
tokens and (event/situation) types is suggestive of a cognitive construal
in terms of memory traces. TTR offers a straightforward way of model-
ling Austinian propositions using records. A proposition is a record of
the form in (36a). The type of propositions is the record type (36b):17
(36) a.
[
sit = r0
sit-type = T0
]
b. Prop =def
[
sit : Record
sit-type : RecType
]
The correspondence with the situation semantics conception is quite
direct. We can define truth conditions as in (37a), which we shall
sometimes notate as in (37b)
(37) a. A proposition p =
[
sit = s0
sit-type = ST0
]
is true iff s0 : ST0
b. p : True
Continuing in a sitsemian spirit, one can now import an essentially
intuitionist logic to underpin the Boolean structure of the space of pro-
positions. (38a,b) are operations on types typically assumed in CTT18,
whereas (38c) is from Cooper (this journal), which in turn goes back
to classical situation semantics:
17 One could, if one so wished, require sit-type to be an extension of the type SIT
postulated in (34).
18 See e.g. (Ranta, 1994), Chapter 2.
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(38) a. ¬T0 is the type T0 → ⊥: the type ¬T0 is witnessed, one needs
to show that every situation of type T0 is also of type ⊥.
b. T1 ∧ T2: to show that T1 ∧ T2 is witnessed, one needs a pair
< p1, p2 > where p1 is of type T1 and p2 is of type T2.
c. T1 ∨ T2: a witness for T1 ∨ T2 is an entity p0 where p0 is of
type T1 or p0 is of type T2.
Given this, we can define the requisite Boolean operations on
propositions:
(39) Given a proposition p =
[
sit = r0
sit-type = T0
]
, its negation is
the following record:
[
sit = r0
sit-type = ¬T0
]
A couple of remarks are worth making: just as in situation semantics,
there is a notion of partiality applicable here. If s is : calm(jerusalem),
it need not be : calm(london). But this is not enough to allow us to
infer that s : ¬calm(london). As a consequence of this the notion of
proposition that emerges is non-classical in the sense given in (40a). Of
course, it is still sound in the sense given in (40b):
(40) a. false(p) does not imply true(¬p)
b. true(p) implies false(¬p)
Conjunction may be defined as follows:
(41) Given a proposition p =
[
sit = r0
sit-type = T0
]
and a proposi-
tion q =
[
sit = r1
sit-type = T1
]
, their conjunction
∧
{p, q} is the
following record:[
sit = < r0, r1 >
sit-type = T0 ∧ T1
]
It is straightforward to show that:
(42) p and q are true iff
∧
{p, q} is true.
Propositional disjunction may be defined as follows:
rlc-fin.tex; 10/05/2005; 1:45; p.20
Situation Semantics: the ontological balance sheet 21
(43) Given a proposition p =
[
sit = r0
sit-type = T0
]
and a proposi-
tion q =
[
sit = r0
sit-type = T1
]
, their disjunction
∨
{p, q} is the
following record:[
sit = r0
sit-type = T0 ∨ T1
]
Note that
∨
here is defined solely for propositions that have the
same situational component.19
It is straightforward to show that:
(44) Either p or q is true iff
∨
{p, q} is true.
The final notion that needs mentioning concerning propositions is
entailment. With propositions as records consisting of a record and a
record type field, a natural (pre)ordering arises that derives from the
corresponding notions on records and record types. Whether one thinks
of records as graphs (e.g. Cooper (this journal)) or as functions (e.g.
(Kopylov, 2003)), one can use standard set theoretic notions of inclusion
to order the record domain. One of the key features of record types is
the subtyping property exemplified above in (32)(see also (Betarte and
Tasistro, 1998), section 3.2.5, (Kopylov, 2003), section 3), and given
here as (45):
(45) If for any label li : T0 that occurs in record type RT1, li : T1
occurs in record type RT2, where T1 ⊑ T0, then RT2 ⊑ RT1
If r2 is a more inclusive record than r1, then the truth of the
proposition
[
sit = r1
sit-type = T1
]
entails the truth of the proposition[
sit = r2
sit-type = T1
]
, since all the constraints holding of r1 extend
to r2. The opposite direction applies to record types: if RT0 ⊑ RT1,
then the truth of the proposition
[
sit = r1
sit-type = RT0
]
entails the
truth of the proposition
[
sit = r1
sit-type = RT1
]
. This discussion can be
19 This has some linguistic justification from the observation, see (Grice, 1989;
Simmons, 2002), that disjunction only works if the two juncts ‘concern a single
issue’.
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summarized as the following sufficient condition for entailment between
propositions:
(46)
[
sit = r0
sit-type = RT0
]
entails
[
sit = r1
sit-type = RT1
]
if r1 ⊇
r0 and RT0 ⊑ RT1.
4.4. Abstraction and Abstract Entities
Propositions entered into the universe courtesy of record cutting oper-
ations. Their recursive structure was further underpinned by Boolean
type constructors. In order to deal with the abstract entities that re-
main to be explicated, questions and outcomes,20 we need to appeal to
two more constructors, the function type constructor and the unique
type constructor:
(47) a. function types: if T1 and T2 are types, then so is (T1 → T2),
the type of functions from elements of type T1 to elements of
type T2. f:(T1 → T2) iff the domain of f is {a|a : T1} and the
range of f is a subset of {a|a : T2}
b. The unique type: if T is a type and x : T , then Tx is a type.
a : Tx iff a = x.
The functional type constructor is deceptively familiar from
Montague Semantics. In the presence of record typing, this becomes
a far richer notion than classical unary λ-abstraction. It can be sim-
ultaneous and restricted, i.e. it allows for multiple entities (including
null many) to be abstracted over simultaneously while encoding restric-
tions. More specifically, since record types allow for multiple labels, the
domain type of the abstract effects simultaneous abstraction ‘from’ the
range type. Moreover, because of the successively dependent nature of
the labels, restrictions can be imposed which apply to one or more
labels. The simultaneous abstract in (48a) can be modelled as the
function in (48b), which has the type in (48c) (assuming some typing
given in terms of the types Ti for xi):
(48) a. λ{x1, . . . , xk}φ(x1, . . . , xk)
[ψ1(x1, . . . , xn1), . . . , ψk(xk, . . . , xnk)]
20 For reasons of space I will not discuss possibilities and facts.
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b.


x1 = a1
. . .
xk = ak
c1 = p1 . . .
ck = pk


7→ φ(a1, . . . , ak)
c. r :


x1 : T1
. . .
xk : Tk
c1 : ψ1(x1, . . . , xn1)
. . .
ck : ψk(xk, . . . , xnk)


→ φ(r.x1, . . . , r.xk)
With this in hand, we can turn to briefly explicating outcomes and
questions.
The class of outcomes was introduced in (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000),
following (Portner, 1997), to describe goals and serve as the denotata
of imperatives, subjunctives and (certain uses of) infinitives:
(49) a. Sit!
b. Bo demands that Mo sit.
c. Mo’s goal is to leave.
Outcomes are closely related to propositions, with the main differ-
ence being temporal—outcomes are intrinsically futurate, but with a
temporal dimension which is typically unanchored (at speech time):
(50) a. Go home. You can then take a nap.
b. Mo requested Bo to resign. He never did.
Truth is not applicable to such entities, what is applicable is the
notion of being fulfilled. We can explicate this in an Austinian fashion—
as records whose fields are a situation and a situation type–abstract, of
which a temporal argument has been abstracted away. We define the
type Irrealis—temporal abstracts over the class of record types:
(51) Irrealis =def (
[
t : Time
]
)RType
An outcome will be a record of the form in (52a), the type Outcome
given in (52b):
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(52) a.
[
sit = r0
irr-sit-type = p0
]
b. Outcome =def
[
sit : Record
irr-sit-type : Irrealis
]
The fulfilledness conditions of an outcome
[
sit = s0
irr-sit-type = p0
]
involve the existence of a situation s1 which is situated temporally
after s0 such that s1 witnesses an instantiation of p0. This is the sense
in which outcomes are ‘futurate’. The witnesses for a given outcome’s
Fulfilledness can be characterized in terms the following family of record
types:21
(53) For an outcome o1 =
[
sit = s0
irr-sit-type = p0
]
Fulfillers(o1) =def

s1 : Record
fulfill − time : Time
c1 : anterior(s0, s1)
p =
[
sit = s1
sit-type = p0(fulfill-time)
]
: True


(54) exemplifies the content of an imperative use. Included is the
basic presupposition of such a use, that the desired outcome is not
fulfilled at speech time:22
(54) Mo: Bo, leave!
21 The notation in (i) is shorthand for (ii). This exemplifies the appeal to the
unique type constructor introduced in (47b), which requires (iii):
(i) p = a : T
(ii) p : Ta
(iii) p : T and p = a
22 Notation such as ∀f : Fulfillers(o)[. . . ] is shorthand for the standard
type theoretic explication of universal statements in terms of functional types
(
[
f : Fulfillers(o)
]
)
[
. . .
]
.
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
spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
utt-time : Time
o =

sit = s0
irr-sit-type = (r :
[
t : Time
]
)
[
c1: leave(b,r.t)
]

: Outcome
c2 : ∀f : Fulfillers(o) ¬[utt-time = f.fulfill-time : Time ]
cont : Command(spkr,addr,utt-time,o)


Given the existence of sitsemian-like propositions, a
proposition/situation-type-like distinction, and a theory of sim-
ultaneous abstraction, it is straightforward to develop a theory of
questions as propositional abstracts. In the current set up propositional
abstracts are functions from records to propositions. (55) exemplifies
the denotations we can assign to a polar, a unary wh, and a binary wh–
interrogative. The polar question is a constant function whose value is
the queried proposition, the unary question ranges over instantiations
by persons of the proposition run(x), the binary question ranges over
instantiations by pairs of persons x and things y of the proposition
greet(x, y):
(55) a. Did Bo run
b. TTR representation: maps records r : T0 =
[ ]
into propositions of the form

 sit = r1sit-type = [
c : run(b)
]


c. who ran
d. TTR representation: maps records r : Twho =[
x : Ind
rest : person(x)
]
into propositions of the form

 sit = r1sit-type = [
c : run(r.x)
]


e. who greeted what
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f. TTR representation: maps records r : Twho,what
=


x : Ind
rest1 : person(x)
y : Ind
rest2 : thing(y)


into propositions of the form
 sit = r1sit-type = [
c : greet(r.x,r.y)
]


Given the polymorphic nature of TTR, the difficulty of defining
a type Question that beset earlier attempts at a theory of questions
as propositional abstracts can be overcome, see (Ginzburg, 2005) for
details. Here I will restrict myself to sketching a type theoretic explic-
ation of the relation of resolvedness, a linguistically significant relation
that relates questions, propositions, and outcomes. As discussed in
some detail in (Ginzburg, 1995b), resolvedness is to questions, what
provability is to propositions. In particular, various NL predicates that
combine syntactically with an interrogative complement, semantically
predicate not of the question denoted by this complement, but of a fact
that resolves that question. Such resolutive predicates include ‘tell’,
‘know’, ‘discover’, and ‘forget’. The resolvedness conditions of polar
interrogatives are fairly uncontroversial: a resolving answer needs to
entail whichever of p or ¬p is factual, assuming the question is decided:
(56) Bo knows whether p (whether Mo is asleep). Hence, either Jo
knows p (that Mo is asleep) or Jo knows ¬p (that Mo is not
asleep).
The situation with wh-questions is far more complicated. As dis-
cussed in inter alia (Boe¨r and Lycan 1985, Ginzburg, 1995a, van Rooy
2003, Asher and Lascarides, 2003), there are various pragmatic factors
which seem to come into the picture when evaluating whether a pro-
position resolves a question, in a given context. These include the goals
associated with the interaction and the knowledge states of the con-
versationalists. To illustrate—whether the inference pattern illustrated
in the scenario in (57) is valid depends on precise details concerning
Anders’ knowledge:
(57) Anders: I wanted to get to Jose`’s house on the Tube. So I asked
Werner where Jose`’s house is. Werner told me that the house
is near Pimlico station. So now I know where Jose`’s house is.
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An analysis of resolvedness needs to integrate semantic constraints
that derive directly from the question with agent-relative information.
In (58), this latter is cashed out in terms of a relation, not further
analysed here, epistemically-sufficient that holds between a proposi-
tion, an agent, and an outcome. This relation is intended to represent
a proposition providing information to an agent that is sufficient for an
outcome to be fulfilled. The semantic constraints in (58) concerning the
question are essentially a type theoretic reformulation of the relation
potential resolvedness from (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000): they involve a
proposition p entailing either an instantiation of the question or the
negative universal. For polar questions this reduces to the characteriz-
ation in (56), given that a polar question (
[ ]
)p has the sole instantiation
p and so the corresponding negative universal is ¬p.
(58) For a question q = (a : A)p(a) ResolvingAnswers(q) =def (p
resolves q relative to B’s desired outcome o)

p : Prop ∧ True
B: Ind
a: A
o : outcome
p1 = q(a) ∨ p1 = ∀x : A¬q(x) : Prop
c2 : entails(p,p1)
c3: want(B,o)
c4 : ep-sufficient(p,B, o)


4.5. Concluding Remarks
Building up ontologies that include abstract entities such as propos-
itions and questions are an important task for semantics in the 21st
century as in the 19th. In light of the ontological labours we undertook
earlier, let us finally return to the Frege-Searle propositional content
hypothesis(FSPCH) which we initially discussed in section 3.2. Recall
that that hypothesis identifies the denotata of a declarative, polar in-
terrogative, and imperative which ‘concern the same situation’, as in
(14), repeated here as (59):
(59) a. Bo will leave.
b. Will Bo leave?
c. Bo, leave!
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As we discussed earlier, identifying the corresponding proposition,
polar question, and outcome is not viable semantically. Nonetheless,
the requisite commonality, needed to explicate adverbial modification
and nominal quantification, is easy to spell out, given the contents we
associate with these sentences uttered in a single context:
(60) a. Bo will leave 7→
Assert(a,b,

sit = s0
sit-type =
[
c: leave(b,t)
]

)
b. Will Bo leave? 7→
Ask(a,b, (
[ ]
)

 sit = s0sit-type = [
c : leave(b,t)
]

)
c. Bo, leave ! 7→
Command(a,b,

sit = s0
irr-sit-type = (r :
[
t : Time
]
)
[
c: leave(b,r.t)
]

)
What is common across the three utterances is the record type[
c: leave(b,t)
]
.
I have argued that the sitsemian approach to ontological construc-
tion helps account for a number of better and lesser worn semantic
puzzles, apart from other more general cognitive and computational
considerations. At the same time, I have sketched an alternative im-
plemention of this approach in a different logical framework, type
theory with records, which one hopes, has the potential for integrating
sitsemian insights with the insights of other dynamic semantic frame-
works. To the extent that the TTR formalization of SU+AEs is viable
it suggests that the results originating in the sitsemian SU+AE are not
framework dependent.
The ontology described here satisfies the following requirements:
1. It is intentional: providing entities such as propositions and ques-
tions which can be shared across participants and languages and
enabling us to develop a theory of event anaphora.
2. It is fine-grained: does not run into logical omniscience or Soames’
puzzle. It is not too fine grained, so it allows for identity of content
across translation or synonymous reformulation.
3. It allows for distinctions to be made between various kinds of ‘in-
formational entities’, including situations/events, situation types,
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propositions, questions, and outcomes. At the same time, common-
alities between these entities can be captured.
4. It provides for role dependency as required for developing a theory
of anaphora and a theory of abstraction which allows for null,
unary, and multiple restricted abstracts. In particular, questions
are propositional abstracts.
References
Aczel, P.: 1988, Non Well Founded Sets. Stanford: California: CSLI Publications.
Allen, J.: 1995, Natural Language Understanding. Redwood City: Ben-
jamin/Cummings.
Allen, J. and R. Perrault: 1980, ‘Analyzing Intention in Utterances’. Artificial
Intelligence 15, 143–178.
Asher, N. and A. Lascarides: 2003, Logics of Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Barwise, J.: 1989a, ‘Scenes and other situations’. In: J. Barwise (ed.): The Situation
in Logic. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Originally published in the Journal of
Philosophy in 1981.
Barwise, J.: 1989b, ‘Situations, Facts, and True Propositions’. In: J. Barwise (ed.):
The Situation in Logic. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Barwise, J. and J. Etchemendy: 1987, The Liar. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barwise, J. and J. Perry: 1983, Situations and Attitudes Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barwise, J. and J. Perry: 1985, ‘Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes’. Linguist-
ics and Philosophy 8, 399–452.
Betarte, G. and A. Tasistro: 1998, ‘Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with record types and
subtyping’. In: G. Sambin and J. Smith (eds.): 25 Years of Constructive Type
Theory. Oxford University Press.
Boe¨r, S. and W. Lycan: 1985, Knowing Who, Bradford Books. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Brown-Schmidt, S., E. Campana, and M. Tanenhaus: 2003, ‘Real-time reference
resolution by naive participants during a task-based unscripted conversation’.
In: J. Trueswell and M. Tanenhaus (eds.): World-situated language processing:
Bridging the language as product and language as action traditions. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Cohen, P. and R. Perrault: 1979, ‘Elements of a plan-based theory of speech acts’.
Cognitive Science 3, 177–212.
Consortium, T. T.: 2000, The TRINDI Book. Gothenburg: University of Gothen-
burg. Available from http://www.ling.gu.se/research/projects/trindi.
Cooper, R.: 1998, ‘Mixing Situation Theory and Type Theory to Formalize In-
formation States in Dialogue Exchanges’. In: J. Hulstijn and A. Nijholt
Proceedings of TwenDial 98, 13th Twente workshop on Language Technology,
Twente University, Twente.
Cooper, R.: (this journal), ‘Austinian truth, attitudes and type theory’.
Coquand, T., R. Pollack, and M. Takeyama: 2003, ‘A Logical Framework with
Dependent Types’. Fundamenta Informaticae 20, 1–21.
rlc-fin.tex; 10/05/2005; 1:45; p.29
30 Jonathan Ginzburg
Fernando, T.: 2001, ‘Conservative Generalized Quantifiers and Presupposition’. In:
SALT, Vol. 11. NYU/Cornell, pp. 172–191.
Fletcher, C.: 1994, ‘Levels of Representation in Memory for Discourse’. In: M. A.
Gernsbacher (ed.): Handbook of Psycholinguistics. Academic Press.
Frege, G.: 1918, ‘Thoughts’. In: P. Geach and M. Black (eds.): Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 3rd Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ginzburg, J.: 1993, ‘Propositional and Non-Propositional Attitudes’. In: P. Aczel, D.
Israel, Y. Katagiri, and S. Peters (eds.): Situation Theory and Its Applications,
III, CSLI Lecture Notes Number 37. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Ginzburg, J.: 1995a, ‘Resolving Questions, I’. Linguistics and Philosophy 18, 459–
527.
Ginzburg, J.: 1995b, ‘Resolving Questions, II’. Linguistics and Philosophy 18, 567–
609.
Ginzburg, J.: 1996, ‘Interrogatives: Questions, Facts, and Dialogue’. In: S. Lappin
(ed.): Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ginzburg, J.: 2005, ‘Questions as Propositional Abstracts in Type Theory with
Records’. Journal of Logic and Computation 15(2), 113-130.
Ginzburg, J. and R. Cooper: 2004, ‘Clarification, Ellipsis, and the Nature of
Contextual Updates’. Linguistics and Philosophy 27(3), 297–366.
Ginzburg, J. and I. A. Sag: 2000, Interrogative Investigations: the form, meaning
and use of English Interrogatives, No. 123 in CSLI Lecture Notes. Stanford:
California: CSLI Publications.
Grice, H. P.: 1989, Studies in the Ways of Words. Harvard University Press.
Reprinted from a 1957 article.
Institute for Creative Technologies, University of Southern California Mission
Rehearsal Exercise System, www.ict.usc.edu/disp.php?bd=proj mre
Karttunen, L.: 1977, ‘Syntax and Semantics of Questions’. Linguistics and
Philosophy 1, 3–44.
Kopylov, A.: 2003, ‘Dependent Intersection: A New Way of Defining Records in
Type Theory.’ In: Proceedings of LICS 2003, pp. 86–95.
Krahmer, E. and P. Piwek: 1999, ‘Presupposition Projection as Proof Construction’.
In: H. Bunt and R. Muskens (eds.): Computing Meaning: Current Issues in
Computational Semantics, Vol. 1. Kluwer.
Litman, D. and J. Allen: 1987, ‘A plan recognition model for subdialogues in
conversation’. Cognitive Science 11, 163–200.
Penn, G.: 2000, ‘The Algebraic Structure of Attributed Type Signatures’. Ph.D.
thesis, Carnegie Mellon University.
Parsons, T.: 1990, Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic
Semantics. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Peterson, P.: 1997, Fact, Proposition, Event, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Poesio, M. and D. Traum: 1997, ‘Conversational actions and discourse situations’.
Computational Intelligence 13, 309–347.
Portner, P.: 1997, ‘The semantics of mood, complementation, and conversational
force’. Natural Language Semantics 5, 167–212.
Ranta, A.: 1994, Type Theoretical Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J.: 1969, Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. and D. Vanderveken: 1985, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Seligman, J. and L. Moss: 1997, ‘Situation Theory’. In: J. van Benthem and A. ter
Meulen (eds.): Handbook of Logic and Linguistics. Amsterdam: North Holland.
rlc-fin.tex; 10/05/2005; 1:45; p.30
Situation Semantics: the ontological balance sheet 31
Simmons, M.: 2002, ‘Disjunction and Alternatives’. Linguistics and Philosophy 25.
Soames, S.: 1985, ‘Lost Innocence’. Linguistics and Philosophy 8, 59–71.
Traum, D.:2003, ‘Semantics and Prgamatics for Questions and Answers for Dialogue
Agents’. In: H. Bunt (ed.) Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on
Computational Semantics. ITK, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
van Rooy, R.: 2003, ‘Questioning to Resolve Decision Problems’. Linguistics and
Philosophy 26, 727–763.
Vendler, Z.: 1972, Res Cogitans. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
rlc-fin.tex; 10/05/2005; 1:45; p.31
rlc-fin.tex; 10/05/2005; 1:45; p.32
